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Introduction 
O 
n September 27, 2002, the WTO Panel in charge of the Canadian softwood 
lumber case opposing Canada (as complainant) to the United States issued its 
final report.
1 Before examining the conclusions of this report, let us recall that the 
U.S. countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber were based on the allegedly 
below-market fees charged by some Canadian provinces for stumpage rights granted 
to Canadian softwood lumber producers on public lands. Stumpage is the right to cut 
standing timber. 
Thus, the central question before the WTO Panel was whether the United States 
may, in light of its WTO international obligations, consider the allegedly low 
Canadian stumpage fees as a countervailable subsidy. 
Before examining the conclusions of the WTO Panel, it is perhaps useful to 
present for those not familiar with this issue a brief history of the lumber dispute 
between Canada and the United States. 
Brief History of the Lumber Dispute 
F 
or nearly 70 years, with a short interruption during the depression years of the 
1930s, Canada’s exports of softwood lumber went duty-free to the United States. 
Lumber I 
During the 1982 recession, some lumber companies in the United States such as 
Pacific Northwest were faced with serious financial difficulties when lumber prices 
collapsed.  
On October 7, 1982, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI), a group of 
U.S. lumber producers, filed a countervailing duty (CVD) petition against softwood 
lumber from Canada. The petition alleged that Canadian provincial and federal 
governments were subsidizing softwood lumber production by selling the right to cut 
timber on public lands at artificially low prices. The allegations were investigated by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). The case was terminated on May 31, 1983, 
when the DOC determined that the stumpage programs conferred no subsidies 
because stumpage fees were not provided to a specific industry at preferential rates.
2 
Lumber II 
On May 19, 1986, the CFLI filed a second CVD petition alleging new evidence 
and a change in U.S. law to support its claim that Canadian and provincial stumpage 
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fees subsidized lumber production. In October 1986, the DOC reversed its prior 
determination in Lumber I, issuing a preliminary decision that stumpage fees were 
sold at preferential rates and benefited a specific industry. The DOC calculated a 
preliminary CVD margin of 15 percent, ad valorem.
3 
The Memorandum of Understanding 
To avoid the political costs of continuing the case while starting the free trade 
negotiations, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) before the DOC issued its final determination in Lumber II. The MOU 
imposed a temporary 15 percent ad valorem tariff (15 percent on the sales value) on 
imports of Canadian softwood lumber, in exchange for a termination of the 
investigation. The GATT Panel which had been established for Lumber II at Canada’s 
request
4 ended its proceedings immediately after this “mutually satisfactory” 
resolution of the dispute. 
Lumber III 
The lumber dispute resurfaced after the announcement by Canada, on September 
3, 1991, of its intention to terminate the Memorandum of Understanding, as provided 
in Article 9 of the memorandum. Immediately afterward, on October 31, 1991, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce self-initiated a countervailing duty investigation on 
certain softwood lumber from Canada. Once again, Canada immediately requested the 
establishment of a GATT Panel, since in its view stumpage fees were not subsidies 
within the meaning of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. According to Canada, the 
countervailing duty investigation was inconsistent with Article 2.1 of this code, which 
required sufficient evidence of the existence of subsidy and injury before launching a 
countervailing duty investigation. The GATT Panel concluded that there was a “lack 
of any apparent legal bar to considering Canadian stumpage as potentially a 
countervailable subsidy.”
5 Even if the dispute before the GATT Panel concerned the 
legitimacy of the countervailing duty investigation itself, and not a formal 
determination by the DOC that stumpage fees were countervailable subsidies, the 
Panel tipped the scales in the sense that it considered stumpage fees potentially 
countervailable subsidies. 
Thus, in 1992, countervailing duties were imposed on Canadian lumber (Lumber 
III).
6 The Canadian Government, the provinces and the Canadian lumber industry 
immediately took the matter before two binational panels envisaged by Article 19 of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
7 It is important to underline 
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that the mandate of these NAFTA panels was only to confirm that the United States 
did not contravene its own national CVD legislation. In other words, in contrast to the 
GATT panels, the mandate of these NAFTA panels was not to examine the matter in 
light of U.S. international obligations. Canada won its case before these two NAFTA 
panels and even before a subsequent NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee. 
The United States ended the imposition of countervailing duties in 1994 and refunded 
$800 million which had been collected. 
This outcome raised a wave a protest in the United States. Some commentators 
even suggested that the binational panel process envisaged by NAFTA was 
unconstitutional. It is necessary to say however that the nationality of the binational 
panel members was apparently a determining factor, since the three Canadian 
members voted differently from the two American members.
8 The United States tried 
to protect itself against this kind of misfortune by modifying its countervailing duty 
legislation following the Uruguay Round.
9 
In order to avoid a new legal battle, Canada and the United States signed, on May 
29, 1996, a new bilateral Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA)
10 which placed export 
fees on Canadian log exports above 14.7 billion board feet. This new bilateral 
agreement expired on March 31, 2001. 
Lumber IV 
On April 2, 2001, immediately after the expiration of the bilateral agreement, the 
U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports filed a CVD complaint with U.S. authorities. 
It claimed a countervailing duty of 40 percent for alleged subsidization of Canadian 
sawmills because of low stumpage fees and log-export restraints.  
Canada had taken the log export restraints issue to the WTO early in 2000.  In 
June 2001, the WTO Panel looking at Canada’s earlier request ruled that log-export 
restraints could not be considered subsidies.
11 As for the question of low stumpage 
fees, that is the issue dealt with in this article. 
The Three WTO Criteria Defining a Subsidy and the 
Issue of the Pricing of Natural Resources: the Case of 
Softwood Lumber 
A 
ccording to WTO texts, a practice is a subsidy if it satisfies three criteria. First, it 
must be “specific”. Second, it must entail a governmental “financial 
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contribution”, and third, it must confer a “benefit” to its recipient. In order to 
successfully challenge the U.S. countervailing duties, Canada had to demonstrate that 
one or more of these criteria were not satisfied in the softwood lumber case. 
With regard to specificity, a program is deemed specific if it is granted selectively, 
in law or in fact, to a group of enterprises. In other words, if it is available for all the 
sectors of the economy, it is not specific and therefore not a subsidy. In the softwood 
lumber case, the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that “there are only two 
industries, sawmills and pulp mills, that use provincial stumpage programs, [so] we 
preliminarily determine that the provincial stumpage programs are specific.”
12 The 
“specificity” criterion does not seem to have been a real issue between the two parties. 
In response to a question from the Panel, Canada stated that it was not pursuing a 
claim pertaining to specificity in this dispute.
13  
Regarding the governmental “financial contribution” criterion, common sense 
would perceive such a contribution to be a sum of money granted by a government to 
an industry. This common-sense perception is misleading in the context of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). This 
agreement specifies clearly that a governmental financial contribution exists not only 
when it provides outright financial assistance, but also in the case where “a 
government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure.”
14 Although 
this provision is clear and seems to apply to stumpage rights, Canada has always 
hoped that the pricing of natural resources by a government was not covered by such a 
provision. In past lumber disputes, Canada frequently invoked arguments inspired by 
the idea that 
natural resource pricing is a sovereign function such that natural resource 
subsidies should be exempt from countervailing duties. For example ... a 
nation which owns its national forests may dispose of them as it sees fit; 
[and] that nation should not be penalized by another nation regardless of 
how it sells and prices its resources.
15 
In the same vein, and supposedly as a confirmation of the idea referred to above, 
Canada invoked in the recent lumber dispute a working paper from the time of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations which explicitly mentioned harvesting rights separately 
from goods or services.
16 The WTO Panel rejected the Canadian argument that the 
rights to exploit in situ natural resources are not covered by Article. 1.1(a)(iii) quoted 
above, which refers to “goods and services other than general infrastructure.” 
According to the Panel, Canada was not able to point to any provision in the SCM 
Agreement that supports this view. In fact, in the Panel’s view, the working paper 
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Canada invoked has little if any probative value, especially in light of the fact that the 
reference to “harvesting rights” as separate from “goods” was not included in the final 
text of the SCM Agreement. 
Canada’s remaining line of defense thus had to be in connection with the “benefit” 
criterion. According to past rulings of WTO panels, a benefit exists when the 
governmental financial contribution “makes the recipient ‘better off’ than it would 
otherwise have been, absent that contribution. In our view, the marketplace provides 
an appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been 
‘conferred’ ….”
17 This definition is sufficient in simple cases where the free “market” 
to which it implicitly refers is easily identifiable. For example, if a Canadian firm 
receives a government loan at an interest rate that is lower than the rate charged by 
Canadian private banks, a benefit will have been conferred upon the recipient firm 
according to this definition. However, the definition becomes less certain when the 
free market to which it implicitly refers as a benchmark for comparison is not easily 
identifiable. For example, are the stumpage rights charged on Canadian private lands 
the result of a free market? It is in this context that the U.S. Department of Commerce 
took a risk by determining that “[s]ince stumpage fees on [Canadian] public lands are 
the price driver for the stumpage market in those Provinces, we conclude that the 
stumpage fees on [Canadian] private lands are largely derivative of the [Canadian] 
public land prices and are therefore distorted.”
18 The DOC then inferred that it could 
not use as a benchmark stumpage fees on Canadian private lands, as the Canadian 
provincial governments would have preferred. In other words, the Department of 
Commerce decided that stumpage fees on Canadian private lands could not be 
regarded as a valid indication of free market forces in Canada and thus were not a 
valid benchmark. Instead, the DOC  decided to use as a benchmark the prices 
prevailing on U.S. private lands near the Canadian border. According to the DOC, 
these prices constitute an adequate benchmark since “it is reasonable to conclude that 
U.S. stumpage would be available to softwood lumber producers in Canada at the 
same prices available to U.S. lumber producers.”
19 After comparing U.S. private 
stumpage fees to stumpage fees on public lands in Canada, the DOC had no trouble 
finding that a benefit was conferred to Canadian softwood lumber producers. 
It was obvious from the start that the method the DOC used in finding a “benefit” 
was its Achilles heel. The WTO Panel adopted this view and agreed with Canada that 
the Department of Commerce violated WTO subsidy rules by using cross-border 
comparisons. The WTO Panel underlined that Article 14(d) of the Uruguay Round 
Subsidies Agreement which deals with governmental provision of goods or services 
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requires that price comparisons “shall be determined in relation to the prevailing 
market conditions ... in the country of provision or purchase.” The United States tried 
to convince the Panel that the existence of a benefit must be determined “in relation to 
the prevailing market conditions in the country under investigation” and not 
necessarily “in the country under investigation”.
20 In other words, the United States 
argued that the “market” benchmark may refer to the entire market available to the 
subsidized producers. The Panel rejected this view and found no basis in the text of 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to conclude that the 
market conditions in Canada could mean anything other than the conditions in 
Canada, and not those prevailing in some other country such as the United States. 
More specifically, the Panel underlined its view that 
to adopt the U.S. approach that the market refers to the entire market 
available to the allegedly subsidized producers, would effectively read out 
of the SCM Agreement the explicit reference to the country of provision as 
the country the prevailing market conditions of which have to be used as a 
benchmark.
21 
Canada therefore prevailed, on the basis that the Department of Commerce did not 
adequately demonstrate the existence of a benefit. 
The Allergy of WTO Panels to the “Distorted Price” 
Approach and Prospects in the Context of the Pending 
Second Lumber Case 
T 
here is no doubt that this ruling constitutes a partial victory for Canada. The legal 
advisers to the U.S. lumber industry claimed until the last minute that they were 
certain that Canada would fail. However, it must be underlined that the Canadian 
victory rests only on the fact that the methodology  used by the Department of 
Commerce for finding a benefit was flawed. The victory would have been decisive if 
the WTO Panel had found the absence of a governmental financial contribution. 
Thus, in the context of a possible new petition by the U.S. lumber industry, the 
present ruling leaves the door open for the United States to use another formula to find 
that a benefit is conferred by the Canadian stumpage programs. In such a case, all 
Canada will have gained is a possibly lower amount of this benefit. Moreover, 
although the United States signaled on November 1, 2002, that it would not appeal the 
present ruling relating to the preliminary determinations by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, it is confident that the cross-border methodology will be vindicated in the 
pending WTO lumber case relating to the final determinations of the U.S. Department 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  352   M. Benitah 
of Commerce.
22 In other words, the United States hopes that the present findings 
relating to the cross-border methodology will be reversed or “overruled” in the 
pending case. Its principal argument will be that the present Panel’s conclusion would 
allow Canada to subsidize its lumber industry with impunity. In other words, the 
United States will argue that a government distorting and controlling almost entirely a 
domestic market via its subsidies cannot benefit from its wrongdoing and then claim 
that its “distorted” domestic (private) prices must be used as a benchmark. 
However, this strategy (or, for that matter, the use of a new methodology in 
possible future petitions by the U.S. lumber industry) would be difficult. One way or 
another, this strategy would once again be based on the rejection of using fees charged 
for stumpage rights on private Canadian lands as a benchmark. The stated reason 
would again be that the level of these fees is “distorted”. It seems, however, that past 
WTO rulings indicate an allergy to such a “distortion” approach, since panel members 
do not find in WTO texts an explicit or implicit indication to corroborate it. For 
example, in the Canada – Milk case under the Agreement on Agriculture, Canada was 
to some extent in a position the reverse of its present one, since it objected to the use 
of the Canadian domestic milk price as a benchmark, arguing that this price was 
distorted. The last WTO Panel in charge of this case rejected this argument by 
underlining that “[t]he only benchmark which is stipulated [in the texts] is the price 
for the domestic market, independently of the extent of government intervention in the 
formation of that price”
23 [italics added by the Panel]. Another indication can be found 
in the Brazil – Aircraft case. Although the legal context of this case was slightly 
different from the softwood lumber case (the criterion at stake being “material 
advantage” and not “benefit”), there are similarities between the cases. Brazil wanted 
to use export credit terms offered by Canada as a benchmark for determining whether 
Brazil’s export credit terms were conferring a “material advantage”. The Brazil – 
Aircraft Panel firmly rejected this position by stressing once again that “nothing in the 
text[s] ... indicates that the examination of material advantage involves a comparison 
with the export credit terms available with respect to competing products from other 
Members” [italics added by the Panel].
24 Although the legal provisions relating to the 
“material advantage” criterion are somewhat different from those governing  the 
“benefit” criterion, the two criteria are close enough to make the Panel’s approach in 
Brazil – Aircraft relevant to the softwood lumber case. Indeed, the position of the 
United States in the softwood lumber case is reminiscent of Brazil’s rejected position 
for finding a benchmark. 
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This allergy to the “distorted price” approach is once again clearly apparent in the 
softwood lumber panel report. In the Panel’s view, the 
prevailing market conditions” of Article 14 (d) of the Subsidies Agreement 
do not refer to a theoretical market free of government interference…. 
[T]he ordinary meaning of the term “prevailing” market conditions is the 
market conditions “as they exist” or “which are predominant”.... [So] we 
are of the view that the text of Article 14 (d) of the SCM Agreement does 
not in any way require the “market” conditions to be those of a 
hypothetical undistorted or perfectly competitive market.
25 
In adopting this view, the Panel was influenced by the fact that Article 14 of the 
SCM Agreement deals with “benefit” to the recipient. The Panel inferred from this 
expression that in order to calculate the benefit to the recipient, an authority must 
compare the price the recipient paid the government with the prices in other domestic 
prevailing market transactions (no matter how “distorted” they are). The previous 
passage explains perhaps why the U.S Department of Commerce has recently tried to 
regain the initiative from the domestic petitioners by proposing to use policy bulletins 
to determine whether Canadian timber pricing is appropriately market-based.
26 This 
means that the DOC would use its discretionary authority to review provincial timber 
pricing policies and reduce or eliminate countervailing duties on exports from 
provinces that are found to have a market-based system. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that the Panel considered that the U.S. Department 
of Commerce should have considered separately the case of lumber producers not 
related to industries benefiting from stumpage rights. Such a case is one of an 
“upstream” or “indirect” subsidy which necessitates the demonstration that these 
lumber producers benefited indirectly from the financial contribution given directly to 
the tenure holders. 
In conclusion one can say that, although at first glance the principal U.S. 
argument in the pending case seems legitimate from a policy point of view, it is 
unlikely that it would prevail legally. The pending Panel will probably once again be 
receptive to the argument that the U.S. approach would effectively read out of Article 
14 of the SCM Agreement the explicit reference to the country of provision as the 
country of which the prevailing market conditions must be used as a benchmark. The 
pending Panel will also probably be receptive to the argument that Article 14 of the 
SCM Agreement deals with “benefit” to the recipient without explicit or implicit 
consideration of the role of “distortion” in the analysis of this benefit.  
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With regard to a new bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States 
about softwood lumber, one can also say that such an agreement is still probable. Of 
course, the recent partial legal victory places Canada in an advantageous position in 
the negotiations of the terms of an agreement, but this victory does not replace the 
need for a negotiated agreement.  
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